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Abstract The scalar quantifier some is locally
ambiguous between pragmatic (some-but-not-all)
and literal (some-and-possibly-all) meanings.
Although comprehenders typically favour an eventual
pragmatic interpretation, debate persists regarding
what factors influence interpretation, the time course
of comprehension, and whether literal meaning takes
precedence. We investigate how the interpretation of
some depends on social reasoning derived from a
speaker’s manner of delivery. Specifically, we test the
effect of disfluency on the derivation of meaning in a
context where hesitation may signal speaker embar-
rassment due to potential face-loss associated with the
literal meaning of ‘‘some’’. Participants ðn ¼ 24Þ
viewed displays comprising two different snack
quantities while hearing a recorded utterance describ-
ing how much a speaker had eaten. Critical utterances
ðn ¼ 16Þ contained the quantifier some, half with a
filled pause disfluency (‘‘I ate\uh[, some oreos’’).
Participants’ eye and mouse movements showed (via
empirical logit regressions) that fluent utterances
yielded a bias toward a pragmatic interpretation, while
disfluency attenuated this bias in favour of the literal
meaning (where the speaker ate all the oreos).
Crucially, this difference emerged rapidly post-onset
of some. Taken together, our findings do not support a
literal-first account of scalar comprehension, but
rather, suggest that some is interpreted rapidly in a
context-dependent manner.
Keywords Disfluency  Scalar implicature 
Discourse context  Eye-tracking  Mouse-tracking
Introduction
Successful comprehension often requires listeners to
infer a speaker’s meaning from an ambiguous utter-
ance. One situation where ambiguity may arise is in
the case of scalar expressions, which can elicit so-
called literal or pragmatic interpretations. Take the
following sentences for example:
1(a) Some coconuts grow on trees.
(b) Some, but not all, coconuts grow on trees.
(c) Some, and possibly all, coconuts grow on
trees.
Sentences such as (1a) typically evoke the interpreta-
tion (1b). This pragmatic inference from some to not
all is taken to reflect reasoning based on the Gricean
maxim of Quantity (Grice 1975): A cooperative
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speaker could have made (1a) more informative by
instead saying all; the fact that they didn’t implies that
they were not in a position to do so, triggering the
pragmatic interpretation (1b). Nevertheless, given a
lower-bound meaning of some to be at least one, a
literal interpretation of (1a) would yield the meaning
(1c). Ambiguity between the two meanings has
yielded a long line of research investigating how
listeners derive the speaker’s intended meaning (e.g.,
Breheny et al. 2006; Carston 1998; Degen 2015; Horn
1984; Russell 2006; Van Tiel et al. 2016), and the
time course with which each meaning arises during
comprehension (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004; Degen
and Tanenhaus 2014; Huang and Snedeker
2011, 2009a, b; Noveck and Posada 2003; Tomlinson
et al. 2013; see Chemla and Singh 2014a, b for
reviews). Although adult comprehenders typically
favour an eventual pragmatic interpretation (Grice
1975; Horn 1972; Noveck 2001; Papafragou and
Musolino 2003; Van Tiel et al. 2016), a continuing
debate centres around the time course of this inter-
pretation and how and when context plays a role.
The timecourse of comprehension
The intuitive ease with which comprehenders deduce
some to mean not all has led some researchers to
propose that these pragmatic inferences are stored in
the lexicon and computed automatically by a dedicated
grammatical system (Chierchia 2004, 2006; Levinson
2000). These accounts predict that the pragmatic
meaning arises automatically and immediately,
although it may be overridden by the literal meaning
later (Bott and Noveck 2004; Breheny et al. 2006).
This view is also consistent with broader evidence that
comprehenders can make rapid pragmatic inferences
about the speaker or discourse, often from the earliest
moments of comprehension (Grodner and Sedivy
2011; Hagoort et al. 2004; Hanna and Tanenhaus
2004; Kurumada et al. 2014; Loy et al. 2017; Rohde
and Horton 2014; Van Berkum et al. 2008).
Evidence from other studies, however, suggests
that the pragmatic interpretation of some is slow and
effortful for listeners to access, arising after its literal
counterpart is derived. In a series of eye-tracking
studies, Huang and Snedeker (2009a, b, 2011) demon-
strated that listeners interpret some as compatible with
its literal meaning before converging on the pragmatic
interpretation. In the some condition, participants told
to follow audio instructions such as ‘‘Point to the girl
that has some/two/all/three of the ice cream sand-
wiches’’ were initially equally likely to fixate the
referent compatible with a literal meaning (girl with
all of the ice cream cones) and a pragmatic meaning
(girl with a subset of the ice cream sandwiches).
Fixations to the pragmatic target did not reliably
exceed chance until 1,100 ms post-onset of some,
suggesting that the pragmatic meaning was not
available during early processing to rule out a literal
interpretation. Similar processing costs for pragmatic
some have been observed in self-paced reading and
sentence verification tasks (Bott et al. 2012; Bott and
Noveck 2004; Breheny et al. 2006). Bott and Noveck
showed, for example, that participants took longer to
evaluate ambiguous sentences such as ‘‘Some ele-
phants are mammals’’ when instructed to assume a
pragmatic interpretation of some, compared to those
instructed to assume a literal interpretation. Moreover,
when given no restrictions on how to interpret some,
participants who intuitively responded with the prag-
matic interpretation took longer than those who
responded with the literal meaning (cf. Noveck and
Posada 2003). Together, these findings demonstrate a
temporal delay associated with pragmatic some,
suggesting some form of costly pragmatic enrichment
applied to an initial literal interpretation.
This position, however, has not gone unchallenged.
Using a similar paradigm and methods to Huang and
Snedeker, Grodner et al. (2010) showed that the
pragmatic meaning of some can arise from the earliest
stages of comprehension, with no evidence of prece-
dence by the literal meaning. Grodner et al. hypoth-
esised that one reason for the pragmatic delay
observed by Huang and Snedeker could have been
the inclusion of trials with an exact number (‘‘Point to
the girl with two of...’’), thereby reducing the felicity
of utterances on some-trials, where the target would
also have two of a set of objects. Modifying their
design to eliminate instructions with exact quantities,
Grodner et al. showed that listeners’ eye movements
converged on the appropriate target within 200–300
ms post-quantifier onset, and were equally fast in
pragmatic some and literal all conditions. Grodner
et al. suggested that the pragmatic delay observed by
earlier studies is not inherent to the actual generation
of the pragmatic inference, but rather arises from the
difficulty in integrating its meaning with available
contextual information, such as considerations about
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alternative forms that the speaker may have used.
They argue that with appropriate and adequate con-
textual support, processing delays associated with the
pragmatic interpretation disappear.
The role of context
Grodner et al.’s results forefront the relevance of
context in the comprehension of scalar expressions.
This notion of contextual-sensitivity has been simi-
larly highlighted by a number of other researchers
(Bonnefon et al. 2009; Breheny et al. 2006; Chierchia
2004; Degen and Tanenhaus 2014). Breheny et al.
(2006) showed, for instance, that the speed with which
some is comprehended is dependent on discourse
context. Experiment 3 manipulated the context in
which participants read sentences (in Greek) contain-
ing a scalar trigger ‘‘some of the Xs’’, and measured
their reading times on a subsequent target segment the
rest, referring to the complement set (the remaining
Xs) evoked by a pragmatic interpretation of some (see
Example 2).
2(a) Mary asked John whether he intended to
host all his relatives in his tiny apartment.
John replied that he intended to host some
of his relatives.
(b) Mary was surprised to see John cleaning
his tiny apartment and she asked why.
John replied that he intended to host some
of his relatives.
Target The rest would stay in a nearby hotel.
In upper-bound contexts (2a), where a reading of at
least one is sufficient and an interpretation of possibly
all is disfavoured by the contrast with all, participants’
reading times were faster compared to lower-bound
contexts (2b), which were compatible with a literal
interpretation of some. This suggests that the context
in which some occurs influences comprehension
depending on whether it supports a literal or a
pragmatic interpretation. In a similar vein, participants
in Bergen and Grodner (2012) were slower to read
sentences containing some in cases where they thought
the speaker of the sentence would know that the
stronger all statement was true, compared to cases
where they thought the speaker might (but did not
necessarily) know that the stronger statement was true.
Although these results still suggest a delay associated
with the pragmatic meaning, they nevertheless high-
light the role of context, in that the speed with which
some is processed is modulated by knowledge of the
discourse or the speaker’s state.
Another form of context that has been found to be
relevant is visual context. Degen (2015) investigated
the interpretation of some using a ‘‘gumball para-
digm’’, in which participants were asked to rate the
naturalness of statements such as ‘‘You got some of the
gumballs’’ depending on howmany gumballs they saw
being partitioned (out of a full set of 13) into a lower
chamber of a gumball machine. Smaller sets (1–3
gumballs) as well as full sets (all 13 gumballs) received
lower ratings than mid-range (5–8) sets. Degen (2015)
proposed that the size of the partitioned set increased
the salience of alternative quantifiers (e.g., two, many,
most, all) for small and large sets, creating listener
expectations about the use of some with different set
sizes. Ratings also decreased when the experiment
included filler sentences which used number terms for
small and large sets, suggesting that participants took
into account lexical alternatives which the speaker had
previously used instead of some. This idea is also
consistent with Grodner et al.’s finding that the
elimination of sentences with exact quantities facili-
tated participants’ processing of pragmatic some.
Bonnefon et al. (2009) demonstrate context-depen-
dency using a different class of context: one in which
the speaker’s politeness goals may be relevant to a
listener (Brown and Levinson 1987). They showed in
an off-line task that sentences which may represent a
face-threat to a listener (cf. Goffman 1967) (e.g.,
‘‘Some people hated your poem’’), were more likely to
generate the literal interpretation that everyone hated
your poem. In contrast, a face-boosting version of the
same sentence (e.g., ‘‘Some people loved your poem’’)
was more likely to elicit the pragmatic interpretation
that not everyone loved your poem. Bonnefon et al.
suggest that in contexts where politeness concerns
may be relevant to the discourse, individuals may
construe some as a politeness device employed by the
speaker to mitigate the effects of a potential face-
threat, leading listeners to consider the more face-
threatening interpretation of the utterance.
Manner of delivery as a contextual cue
While existing literature provides evidence that scalar
comprehension may depend on its global context of
123
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occurrence, comparatively little work has examined
how interpretation may be affected by a more local
source of variation—that of the speaker’s manner of
delivery. There are reasons to believe that manner of
delivery may influence the interpretation of some due
to a listener’s reasoning about the social context.
Research outside of scalar comprehension highlights
the perceptual relevance of spoken manner on various
aspects of pragmatic comprehension (e.g., Kurumada
et al. 2014; Van Berkum et al. 2008). A particular
focus of recent research has been on disfluencies, or
pauses in the fluent flow of an utterance, whether silent
or filled with a sound such as um or uh.
Disfluencies tend to be produced during more
complex dialogue turns (Bortfeld et al. 2001), before
longer utterances (Oviatt 1995), and at major dis-
course boundaries (Boomer 1965). Speech task com-
plexity is often cited as an important predictor of filled
pauses (e.g., Barr 2001; Merlo and Mansur 2004;
Womack et al. 2012). Filled pauses are used equally
often across demographic groups, compared to filler
words such as like or you know (Laserna et al. 2014),
suggesting that they may be automatically produced as
a consequence of cognitive load. However, cognitive
load doesn’t appear to be the sole predictor of
disfluency. For example, Smith and Clark (1993)
noted that an um can precede the single-word answer
to a question; this may be providing a speaker with
time to retrieve the answer to a question while
simultaneously cueing the listener to tune in (Clark
and Fox Tree 2002).
Following an utterance-medial disfluency, listeners
are more likely to predict a mention of an object that is
new to the discourse (Arnold et al. 2004) or requires a
longer noun phrase to name (Arnold et al. 2007). The
N400 ERP response, taken to index the consequences
of processing something unpredictable in context, is
attenuated when an unpredictable noun directly
follows a filled (Corley et al. 2007) or silent pause
(MacGregor et al. 2010).
As well as their effects on prediction, disfluencies
such as um or uh have been found to influence
listeners’ pragmatic inferences about whether or not a
speaker is lying (see Zuckerman et al. 1981, for an
early review). Importantly, recent findings show that
listeners very quickly integrate such paralinguistic
cues from the earliest moments of comprehension to
shape their overall utterance interpretation (King et al.
2017; Loy et al. 2017), highlighting the speed with
which manner of delivery can affect meaning con-
struction via a process of social reasoning.
Preliminary work by Bonnefon et al. (2015) also
suggests that manner of delivery may influence
comprehenders’ eventual interpretations of some
within a relevant social context. Based on earlier
findings that a speaker’s politeness goals affect the
meaning of some for comprehenders (Bonnefon et al.
2009), Bonnefon et al. (2015) hypothesised that silent
pauses might influence listeners’ interpretations of the
quantifier within such a context, by functioning as a
social cue to shift expectations toward unpleasant
information.
(3) Yesterday, you pitched an idea to a group of five
persons. Today, you ask Bob (who was in the
group) what people thought of your idea. Bob
\stays silent for a few seconds. Then he[
replies: ‘‘Some people hated your idea.’’
The study manipulated the description of whether or
not a speaker remained silent in a scenario before
delivering a face-threatening expression [see example
(2)], and asked participants to rate the extent to which
the statement warranted a literal interpretation (i.e.
possibly everyone hated your poem). Scenarios in
which the speaker was described as remaining silent
before speaking received higher ratings in favour of
the more unpleasant interpretation—in this case the
literal interpretation of some. Conversely, with a face-
boosting expression (e.g., ‘‘Some people loved your
idea’’), the same pause description yielded higher
ratings in favour of pragmatic interpretation of some
(i.e. not everyone loved your idea).
Bonnefon et al.’s (2015) results are indicative on
two fronts. Firstly, in line with previous work, they
outline a relationship between context and the com-
prehension of scalar expressions (Bonnefon et al.
2011, 2009; Breheny et al. 2006; Cummins and Rohde
2015; Degen and Tanenhaus 2014; Feeney and
Bonnefon 2012; Katsos and Bishop 2011). Second,
they provide prima facie evidence that given a relevant
context, interpretations of some may vary with the
manner in which the utterance is presented. However,
Bonnefon et al. used a task in which participants were
explicitly asked to consider the possibility of the literal
meaning of some, following a pause which could be
presumed to be relevant to the interpretation of the
utterance, given that it was explicitly described. As
123
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such, the results likely reflect metalinguistic reasoning
about a manner of delivery to which participants’
attention had been drawn. While these findings
establish a relationship between the manner of deliv-
ery of an expression and a comprehender’s eventual
considered interpretation of some, they leave open the
question of whether such cues influence the interpre-
tation of more naturally-produced utterances during
real-time comprehension.
The present study
The present study investigates whether spoken manner
of delivery influences a listener’s interpretation of the
ambiguous quantifier some, during the moment-to-
moment processing of the linguistic expression. In the
experiment, listeners make an implicit choice between
a literal and a pragmatic interpretation of some based
on a speaker’s fluent or disfluent delivery of the scalar
expression. In a similar manner to Bonnefon et al.
(2015), we established a context that exploited the
concept of face (Goffman 1967)—in this case, one in
which a literal interpretation of some would threaten
the positive self-image of the speaker. To achieve this,
we invented a cover story about a fictitious experiment
investigating greed and snacking habits.
The cover story was as follows:We described a set of
participants who were provided with a variety of snacks
to eat while watching a documentary film. They
received no instruction other than that they could eat
as much or as little as they liked, and had to answer
questions about the film in a verbal interview afterwards.
We described that the study’s motivation of investigat-
ing greed was revealed after the documentary, and then
the fictitious participants were asked to report howmuch
of each snack they had eaten (e.g., ‘‘I ate five oreos’’).
Participants in the current experiment were told that
they would hear recordings of people who had taken
part in the earlier experiment. This set up a context in
which speakers who had consumed all of a snack
might plausibly exploit the ambiguity of some to avoid
face-loss through an admission to greed. Crucially,
speakers might be disfluent as a by-product of the
calculation of the potential threat to their positive self-
image. In other words, ‘‘I ate uh, some oreos’’ could be
taken to mean that a speaker ate all of the oreos but is
embarrassed to admit it.
Each recorded utterance was played while partic-
ipants viewed a visual display comprising two plates,
with each plate depicting a quantity of one of the snack
items. Participants were tasked with clicking on the
plate that depicted what was left behind, based on the
speaker’s description. We measured their eye- and
mouse-movements during each trial. Critical utter-
ances made use of the quantifier some. Half of these
included a filled pause disfluency, chosen to avoid any
likelihood that, once items were being performed
rather than described, a silent hesitation could be
construed as a prosodic pause (e.g., Ferreira 2007).
We tested participants’ interpretations of some
using an Ambiguous display, where both plates were
compatible with the utterance— an empty plate (no
snacks remaining) was compatible with the literal
interpretation, while a second plate with a number of
snacks remaining was compatible with the pragmatic
meaning. Based on existing research, we expected an
overall bias toward a pragmatic interpretation of some
(Noveck 2001; Papafragou and Musolino 2003;
Van Tiel et al. 2016). Importantly, on the basis that
the face-saving context would induce listeners to
interpret a disfluency as a signal that the speaker was
avoiding face-loss, we expected filled pauses to yield a
higher rate of the literal interpretation, and thus an
increase in fixations on, mouse movements towards,
and mouse clicks on the empty plate.
A potential concern with our predictions is that
disfluency may affect the interpretation of some for
other reasons. For example, previous work has shown
that listeners can interpret disfluency as a signal of
simple deception, where the speaker means the
opposite of what they say (Akehurst et al. 1996;
Zuckerman et al. 1981). These effects have been
shown to rapidly influence comprehension, emerging
almost as soon as a listener can infer meaning based on
the unfolding linguistic input (Loy et al. 2017). Thus,
given the typical inference that some means not-all, a
disfluency construed as a signal of deception might
quickly bias listeners toward the plate compatible with
the atypical literal meaning, in this case the empty
plate. In an attempt to rule out alternative accounts of
our findings, we included a second condition in the
experiment, which included a Control display. In this
condition, one plate had a few snacks remaining, as in
the Ambiguous condition (for ease of reference, we
refer to this plate throughout as the ‘pragmatic’ plate).
However the second plate—a distractor—always had
6 snacks remaining, corresponding to one piece having
been eaten (see Fig. 1). We reasoned that if listeners
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interpret disfluency within the social context estab-
lished by the experiment, disfluency should be asso-
ciated with face-saving. This should lead to a bias
towards the plate with the most snacks missing
following disfluency. Crucially, any bias towards the
distractor plate following disfluency in the Control
condition would suggest that a face-saving account
could not be sustained; disfluency would only be
associated with the removal of a single snack under
different circumstances, such as those in which
disfluency signals deception.
Participants’ eye- and mouse-movements were
recorded on each trial, as well as their eventual
interpretations (plate clicked) and response times. We
expected disfluency to result in more movements
towards, and clicks on, the distractor (empty, literal
interpretation-compatible) plate in Ambiguous trials. In
Control trials, we did not expect an increase in
movements towards or clicks on the distractor (one
snack removed, incompatible with face-saving) follow-
ing disfluency. Of particular interest were the timings
withwhich any biases inmovements emerged: The eye-
and mouse-tracking records allow us to establish when,
relative to encountering the ambiguous some, listeners
begin to commit to a particular interpretation.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four self-reported native British English
speakers took part in the experiment. Sample size
was based on those of Loy et al. (2017, n ¼ 21; 22), in
which two experiments included eye- and mouse-
movement analyses comparable to those of the present
design. All participants were right-handed mouse
users with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. An
additional 3 participants were tested, but their data
were not included in our analyses because they
suspected the authenticity of the cover story (2) or
that the audio had been scripted for the experiment (1;
determined during debrief). Participants were
recruited from the University of Edinburgh commu-
nity and each received £5 for participation. All
participants provided informed consent in accordance
with the university’s Psychology Research Ethics
Committee guidelines (ref no.: 136-1617/1).
Materials and design
Eight different types of snacks were used as referents
in the experiment. The cover story established a
starting quantity of 7 for each snack item (see Fig. 2).
The 8 snacks were chosen based on a pre-test of 12
snacks, in which respondents indicated the likelihood
that they would eat up to 7 pieces of each snack in one
sitting.
On each trial, participants saw a visual display
comprising two plates, each depicting a quantity
(range 0–7) of one of the snack items. This quantity
represented the number of pieces of the snack that
remained (out of 7). The name of the snack was
displayed below each plate to avoid ambiguity in cases
where 0 pieces remained. Each display was accompa-
nied by a recording of a speaker describing how much
of a snack they had eaten. The utterances were
produced by 8 speakers (4 male; all native British
speakers), each contributing 8 utterances (one per
snack), for a total of 64 utterances used in the
experiment. Two out of each speaker’s 8 utterances
were critical utterances; the other 6 were fillers.
Snacks were balanced across speakers such that each
snack only occurred as a referent in two critical
Fig. 1 Example of displays
used in a ambiguous and
b control trials. In both
displays the plate on the left
depicts the pragmatic
interpretation of some
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utterances, each by a different speaker, with no two
speakers associated with the same two critical
referents.
Speakers were recorded individually using a Zoom
H4N digital recorder. For the first recording, a female
speaker who had prior experience producing disfluent
speech materials read the sentences from a script. All
subsequent speakers were recorded via a shadowing
procedure in which they listened to the first speaker’s
recordings and imitated the speech, utterance by
utterance (cf. Bosker et al. 2014; Hanulı´kova´ et al.
2012). From each speaker’s recordings, a filled pause
disfluency (‘‘uh’’) from the disfluent utterance that
sounded the most natural was excised and cross-
spliced into each fluent critical utterance to create a
disfluent counterpart. This ensured that each speaker’s
critical utterances were identical (bar disfluency
manipulation) across the fluent and disfluent condi-
tions. All utterances were normalised to have the same
mean acoustic intensity.
On critical utterances, the speaker used some to
describe how much of the snack they had eaten. In
Ambiguous displays, this was compatible with two
interpretations of some—a pragmatic interpretation
depicting 2, 3 or 4 remaining pieces of the referent
(i.e. corresponding to 5, 4 or 3 pieces having been
eaten), and a literal interpretation depicting 0 pieces.
These quantities for the pragmatic interpretation were
chosen based on evidence that some is perceived as
most natural when used to reference intermediate set
sizes (e.g., 6–8 out of 13 gumballs; Degen 2015). In
Control displays, the first plate depicted 2, 3 or 4
remaining pieces, as in Ambiguous displays. The
second plate, a distractor, contained 6 pieces of the
referent to illustrate one piece having been eaten—an
interpretation intended to be incompatible with any
bias to interpret some literally in a face-saving context.
Half of the utterances accompanying each display
were fluent (‘‘I ate some crackers’’) and the other half
disfluent (‘‘I ate uh, some crackers’’). Hence, the study
followed a 2 (manner: fluent/disfluent) 9 2 (display:
Ambiguous/Control) within-subjects design, with
critical utterances counterbalanced across 4 lists. The
quantity displayed on the pragmatic plate on each trial
was chosen at random from a list, with 2, 3 and 4
represented equally across conditions. Within each
condition, the pragmatic plate appeared on the left and
the right an equal number of times.
The 16 critical trials were randomly presented
together with 48 fillers. To increase variability, these
included a number of manipulations in the speaker’s
manner. Half of the filler utterances were fluent; the
other half contained some other form of disfluency
(e.g., a prolongation: ‘‘I aate... four oreos’’) or a hedge
suggesting uncertainty about the exact quantity eaten
(e.g., ‘‘I ate maybe... three jelly babies’’). Filler
utterance types were distributed across speakers such
that each speaker produced an even mix of fluent and
non-fluent filler utterances. Filler trials also varied at
the level of display. In half the filler displays, the
Fig. 2 Snack items used as
referents in the experiment
123
J Cult Cogn Sci
distractor plate depicted a different quantity of the
referent snack. In the other half, the distractor plate
depicted a different snack, with half of these depicting
the same quantities of each snack. This manipulation
had the purpose of discouraging listeners from focus-
ing only on the quantifier to disambiguate between the
two plates on each trial. Filler displays were dis-
tributed such that each of the 8 speaker’s filler
utterances were accompanied by a variety of filler
display types. The same set of filler trials was used in
all 4 experimental lists.
Procedure
The experiment was presented using OpenSesame
3.1.0 (Mathoˆt et al. 2012) on a 21 in. CRT monitor.
Eye movements were monitored using an Eyelink
1000 Tower Mount system sampling at 500 Hz.
Mouse coordinates were sampled at 50 Hz.
Participants were first briefed on the cover story
which established the context in which the utterances
were produced. To corroborate the story, the instruc-
tions included a photo ostensibly taken of a participant
taking part in the fictitious experiment.
Following the instructions, the eyetracker was
calibrated. Between trials, participants underwent a
manual drift correction using a central grey fixation
dot. After this, the dot turned red for 500 ms to signal
the start of the trial. Each trial began with a 1000 ms
presentation of the two full plates containing 7 items
each. This served to remind participants of the starting
quantity of each snack item. The two plates were
centred vertically and positioned horizontally left and
right on the screen. This was followed by a 1000 ms
preview of the actual quantities associated with each
snack for the trial. After this, a mouse pointer appeared
at the centre of the screen and playback of the
utterance began. Participants were instructed to click
on the plate depicting the quantity remaining based on
the speaker’s description of what they ate. For
example, if the participant heard ‘‘I ate five oreos’’,
they would click on the plate depicting two oreos.
There was no feedback except in cases where partic-
ipants failed to click on a plate within 5000 ms post-
utterance offset, following which they received a
message to respond more quickly. Participants under-
went 4 practice trials and were given the opportunity to
ask questions afterwards, before the main experiment
began. None of the practice trials included the word
some.
After the experiment, participants completed a
post-test questionnaire in which they were asked
(a) whether they noticed anything striking about the
audio or visual stimuli, and (b) what they believed the
experiment was investigating. Any participant who
answered ‘‘yes’’ to the first question was asked to
elaborate verbally on this during the debrief; a note
was made if they mentioned being suspicious that the
disfluencies were not naturally produced or that the
audio had been scripted for the experiment. Partici-
pants were also questioned during debrief on whether
they had suspected the authenticity of the cover story
after the experimental manipulation had been
revealed. Data from participants who questioned the
authenticity of the recordings (1 participant) or did not
believe the cover story (2) were excluded from
analysis.
Results
Statistical analyses were carried out in R Version 3.3.3
(R Core Team 2017). Our analyses focused on
listeners’ final interpretations of some for each utter-
ance (plate clicked), response times, eye movements
and mouse movements. For each dependent variable,
we modelled the effect of manner of delivery (fluent/
disfluent) individually for each display type (Ambigu-
ous/Control). To evaluate the difference in the effect
of manner on the two display types, we also ran an
interaction model taking into account both manner and
display as fixed effects. Predictors were mean centred
in all analyses.
Logistic regression was used to model the binary
outcome of which plate participants clicked on. The
distribution of responses reflected an overwhelming
bias toward a pragmatic interpretation of some. To
avoid spurious ceiling effects, a generalised linear
model by robust methods was fit using the glmrob
function from the robustbase package (Maechler et al.
2016). This approach produces more robust estimation
of regression parameters in cases where inference
based on maximum likelihood may yield unreliable
results (Cantoni and Ronchetti 2001). Linear mixed
effects regression was used to model participants’
response times, using the lmer function from the lme4
package (Bates et al. 2014). Models included by-
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subjects and by-items random intercepts and slopes for
manner and display.
Eye-tracking records were averaged into 20 ms
bins, each comprising 10 samples, prior to analysis.
Data were coded in terms of fixations toward either
one of the plates or areas outside of both. The
proportion of fixations to each plate out of the total
sum of fixations was computed for each time bin.
Mouse-tracking analysis only took into account the
X coordinates. For each sample, the distance travelled
by the mouse was computed by taking the absolute
difference between the X coordinates of the current
and previous samples. The data were coded for
direction of movement toward either one of the plates
for each bin, and the cumulative distance participants
hadmoved the mouse toward each plate was computed
by summing over the distance travelled in each
direction up until that time bin (taking into account
all previous mouse movements in that direction on that
trial). For each plate, we then calculated a proportion-
of-movement measure, defined as the distance trav-
elled by the mouse pointer towards the given object,
divided by the total distance travelled (regardless of
X direction).
To evaluate whether manner of delivery influences
listeners’ processing of some during real-time com-
prehension, eye- and mouse-tracking data were anal-
ysed over an 800 ms time window beginning from
200 ms post-quantifier onset. This window corre-
sponds to the duration of the quantifier and subsequent
referent, taking into account the 200 ms it typically
takes to program and execute an eye movement (Matin
et al. 1993), and ending just before the average
utterance offset (1071 ms). Models for this window
were fitted using empirical logit regression (Barr
2008), taking as the dependent variable the difference
between the e-logit of fixations (or mouse movements)
to the two plates on each trial. Fixed effects included
time, manner and display (all predictors mean cen-
tred). All models included by-subjects and by-items
random intercepts and slopes for all predictors.
Click responses
Table 1 shows the breakdown of mouse clicks
recorded on each plate following fluent and disfluent
utterances on each display. The last column shows the
mean response time (in ms) measured from the onset
of some.
For Ambiguous displays, a robust logistic regres-
sion on the outcome of mouse clicks showed an effect
of manner of delivery. Disfluent utterances resulted in
fewer clicks on the pragmatic plate (and therefore
more clicks on the literal plate), b ¼ 1:70,
SE ¼ 0:86, p ¼ :049. A linear mixed effects regres-
sion on listeners’ response times showed an effect of
manner of delivery. Listeners were slower to click on a
plate following a disfluent utterance, b ¼ 260:46,
SE ¼ 74:81, t ¼ 3:48. For Control displays, there was
no effect of manner on listeners’ mouse clicks (p ¼ :6)
or response times (t ¼ 1:38). These results provide
no evidence to support the disfluency-signals-simple-
deception hypothesis.
A robust logistic regression on listeners’ mouse
clicks including both manner and display as predictors
showed no effect of either, nor any interaction
between the two (all p[ :1). A linear mixed effects
regression on response times showed no main effects
of manner or display, but yielded a manner by display
interaction, b ¼ 368:15, SE ¼ 106:78, t ¼ 3:45,
reflecting the longer time taken by listeners to click
on a plate following a disfluent utterance on Ambigu-
ous displays.
Eye movements
Figure 3 shows the proportion of fixations to each
plate over time until 2000 ms post-some onset, by
which point participants had typically moved the
mouse over one of the two plates. The pattern of
fixations on Ambiguous displays demonstrates a
Table 1 Breakdown of mouse clicks (raw count) recorded on
each plate and mean response times (in ms) following fluent/
disfluent utterances on Ambiguous/Control displays
Plate clicked Response time
Pragmatic Competitora
Ambiguous
Fluent 94 2 1842 (74.6)
Disfluent 86 10 2103 (73.0)
Control
Fluent 95 1 1914 (66.0)
Disfluent 94 2 1807 (63.6)
Standard errors are in parentheses
a On Ambiguous displays the competitor plate represented the
literal meaning of some; on Control displays the competitor
was a distractor incompatible with any meaning of some
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baseline bias toward the pragmatic plate relative to the
literal plate. This likely reflects a preference to look at
plates with objects over empty plates, and is consistent
with earlier studies which report a fixation bias to the
image with the largest quantity of items prior to
disambiguation (Grodner et al. 2010; Huang and
Snedeker 2009b). As predicted under a model in
which disfluency is interpreted in a social context,
there is an influence of manner of delivery. Fluent
utterances led to a rapid rise in fixations to the
pragmatic plate after the onset of some; on disfluent
utterances, this increase was attenuated. This differ-
ence was reflected in a time by manner interaction,
b ¼ 3:55, SE ¼ 0:46, t ¼ 7:71.
In contrast, on Control displays, disfluent utterances
saw an earlier rise in fixations to the pragmatic plate
compared to fluent utterances, as evidenced by a time by
manner interaction,b ¼ 1:19, SE ¼ 0:50, t ¼ 2:39.
The difference in the effect of manner on the
Ambiguous and Control displays was confirmed by a
Fig. 3 Proportion of
fixations to each display
plate over time during fluent
and disfluent utterances for
Ambiguous (top) and
Control (bottom) displays.
Shaded areas represent 1
SE of the mean. On
Ambiguous displays the
competitor represented a
literal meaning of some; on
Control displays the
competitor was a distractor
incompatible with any
meaning of some
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three-way time by manner by display interaction,
b ¼ 4:78, SE ¼ 0:68, t ¼ 7:09. We note that this
result nevertheless does not support a disfluency-
signals-simple-deception hypothesis, which predicts a
fixation bias to the competitor plate following disflu-
ent utterances. We return to this effect in the
Discussion.
Mouse movements
Figure 4 shows the proportion of mouse movements (in
terms of distance travelled) toward each plate over time
until 2000 ms post-some onset. Mouse movements
follow a pattern compatible with the fixation data. On
Ambiguous displays, participants’ mouse movements
exhibited a preference for the pragmatic plate over the
literal plate following fluent utterances, which was
attenuated during disfluent utterances, b ¼ 2:87,
SE ¼ 0:34, t ¼ 8:44. In contrast, on Control displays
mouse movements were characterised by a greater
preference for the pragmatic plate over the competitor
during disfluent utterances, b ¼ 1:41, SE ¼ 0:31,
t ¼ 4:57. This effect aligns with the early fixation
bias to the pragmatic plate following disfluent utter-
ances on Control displays. As with the eye move-
ments, the difference in the effect of manner on
listeners’ mouse movements during the two displays
was confirmed by a three-way time by manner by
display interaction, b ¼ 4:22, SE ¼ 0:49, t ¼ 8:63.
Discussion
This study set out to test whether listeners’ interpre-
tations of the ambiguous quantifier some vary with the
speaker’s manner of delivery. Like Bonnefon et al.
(2015), we made use of a social context that exploited
the concept of face—in this case one where snacking is
associated with greed, which in turn threatens the
positive self-image of a speaker. This allowed us to
establish a context in which a speaker’s disfluency
could be perceived as a social cue that signals a
potential face-loss for the speaker. Our results suggest
that listeners did indeed assign this social meaning to
speakers’ disfluencies. Fluent utterances yielded an
overwhelming bias toward the pragmatic interpreta-
tion. This pattern follows a robust trend established in
the literature for adult listeners to assign to some a
meaning of not all. However, when the literal
meaning—the plate associated with the socially dis-
preferred meaning of having greedily eaten all the
snacks—was available as an alternative interpretation,
disfluency attenuated the bias toward the pragmatic
interpretation. This was apparent in Ambiguous dis-
plays, where disfluent utterances led to a decrease in
the proportion of mouse clicks on the pragmatic plate
in favour of the literal plate, as well as a shift in eye-
and mouse-movements in the same direction.
Under an alternative account for the effect of
manner, such as one of simple deception, disfluent
utterances in the Control condition should have
elicited a bias toward the competitor plate, which
only had one snack missing. However, we found no
evidence of such a bias. Instead, listeners’ mouse
clicks on the pragmatic plate were at ceiling for both
fluent and disfluent utterances in the Control condi-
tion, while their eye and mouse movements suggest
that disfluent utterances in fact led to an earlier bias
toward the pragmatic plate compared to fluent utter-
ances. This is consistent with the view that disfluency
is associated with a potential face-loss for the speaker.
On this view, the disfluency signals in the fictitious
context that the speaker has done ‘something bad’; as
more linguistic information becomes available, this is
combined with the conceptual and visible context to
form a coherent interpretation of the utterance, in
which the implication is that the speaker has eaten
more snacks (pragmatic plate) than one (distractor).
Obviously, the present findings are limited to scalar
some, which has been an important testbed for the
processing of implicatures. In principle, though, there
is nothing special about the effects that we show: They
should extend to other cases where a listener can infer
pragmatic enrichments of the words uttered by the
speaker based on the context in which the utterance
was made, and the manner in which it was delivered.
For example, it is easy to imagine a face-saving
interpretation of an utterance such as ‘‘your poem was,
uh, good’’.
Our results are significant on two fronts. Firstly, in
line with recent work, we demonstrate listeners’
sensitivity to manner-based cues such as a disfluency
in shaping their on-line pragmatic hypotheses about a
speaker’s message. Extending previous studies which
have focussed on listeners’ global pragmatic infer-
ences such as whether or not a speaker was lying (King
et al. 2017; Loy et al. 2017), here we show that
disfluency influences a listener’s real-time
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interpretation of a more local source of inferencing:
meaning associated with the ambiguous quantifier
some. These results build on earlier findings that
demonstrate that listeners make rapid use of a
speaker’s disfluencies to evaluate syntactic ambiguity
(Bailey and Ferreira 2007) or to predict semantic
content (Arnold et al. 2007, 2004; Barr and Seyfed-
dinipur 2010; Corley et al. 2007) in an utterance, by
showing an early tendency to move from a pragmatic
to a literal interpretation of some in the face of
disfluency. Our study therefore further highlights the
flexibility of the comprehension system in using
manner of delivery as a cue to facilitate understanding,
by drawing on different processes depending on the
comprehension goals of the listener.
Secondly, and importantly, the time course of our
effects demonstrates that listeners’ pragmatic
hypotheses about a speaker’s utterance unfold during
the initial stages of comprehension. The presence of
disfluency attenuated responses compatible with a
Fig. 4 Proportion of mouse
movements to each display
plate over time during fluent
and disfluent utterances for
Ambiguous (top) and
Control (bottom) displays.
Shaded areas represent 1
SE of the mean. On
Ambiguous displays the
competitor represented a
literal meaning of some; on
Control displays the
competitor was a distractor
incompatible with any
meaning of some
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pragmatic inference almost as soon as listeners could
assign a meaning to some, and prior to the speaker’s
completion of the utterance. The present experiment
therefore provides no evidence to support a temporal
precedence of literal comprehension, in either the eye
or mouse movement measures. Rather, our results
suggest that listeners very rapidly take into account
both manner of delivery and social context to assign
meaning, via a process of reasoning about the
speaker’s underlying motivations (e.g., to avoid
face-loss from admitting to greed).
From a methodological perspective our results are
relevant to psycholinguistic research investigating the
time course of language processing. Building on
studies that have used mouse-tracking to replicate
existing eye-tracking paradigms (e.g. Farmer et al.
2007; Spivey et al. 2005), we demonstrate that the two
methods can be successfully combined in a visual
world paradigm to yield a corroborating account of
real-time language comprehension. In particular, the
present experiment provides complementary evidence
to our earlier work (King et al. 2017; Loy et al. 2017)
which employed a similar paradigm to explore how
disfluency modulates listeners’ on-line hypotheses
about a speaker’s truthfulness. Thus, we show that this
method can be used across various contexts to explore
different pragmatic phenomena. This opens up possi-
bilities for visual world research to employ a mouse-
tracking only methodology, such as to study popula-
tions which may present challenges in eye-tracking
(e.g., certain clinical or developmental groups, cf.
Sasson and Elison 2012), or to obtain time course data
on a large-scale through web-based data collection.
Within the field of scalar research, our findings are
consistent with the view that the interpretation of some
depends on its context of occurrence (Bonnefon et al.
2015, 2009; Breheny et al. 2006; Cummins and Rohde
2015; Degen and Tanenhaus 2014; Grodner et al.
2010). The majority of these studies have focussed on
how context matters in listeners’ off-line interpreta-
tion of scalar expressions; however, the present results
highlight the role of context from the earliest stages of
comprehension. Exploring the range of context-driven
effects, such as by taking into account different types
of context and how they play out during on-line
comprehension, would be a useful avenue for future
research on scalars.
One question arising from the current study, for
example, is the nature of the interplay between social
context and manner of delivery. Would the same
results be observed in a context where a filled pause
may serve as a different type of collateral signal (e.g.,
speaker uncertainty—see Brennan and Williams
1995), or in cases where its pragmatic relevance was
eliminated altogether? While these questions lie
beyond the scope of the current study, we propose
that social and visual context deserves better attention
in future research addressing the pragmatic under-
standing of spoken language. Our present results
highlight that listeners’ on-line pragmatic hypotheses
regarding the meaning of some are modulated by the
manner in which an utterance is conveyed and the
context in which it is uttered. Crucially, this inference
unfolds during the earliest stages of processing. Thus,
we find no evidence for an ‘‘early stage’’ of under-
standing independent of context.
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